The Problematic of Lacan’s Philosophy
        
                               ZHANG Yibing                                
Abstract: For the first time the deep problematic of Lacan’s philosophy has been discussed from the point of philosophy. Two important academic components have been extracted from Lacan’s logic: the negative ontological logic and the existentialism of disconfirmation. On this basis, the paper proceeds to the pseudo-antecedence of other usurpation and aggressiveness, in which Heidegger’s theory of projection is overturned in Lacan’s philosophical logic. With an analysis of the historical context of Lacan’s philosophy, the paper develops the subversive relation between Lacan and his academic supporting background. 

Key Words: Lacan’s philosophy; the impossibility of being; negative ontology; antecedent usurpation

0 Jacques Lacan (1901-1983) is French psychoanalyst and intellectual. The present post-modern context observes his growing influences on the academic thought of the time. As a matter of fact, Lacan’s thought should belong to the place and time, in which he lived. The key to the understanding of Lacan, I believe, lies in the historic problematic of his thought and his solutions, instead of the independent analysis of Lacan’s text. This is£¬in my opinion, extremely important for us to understand Lacan’s work, which is notoriously obscure. In another word, the obscurity of Lacan’s philosophy stems from his unusual logic approach rather than his wordplays. Most concepts of commonplace discourse in Lacan’s text turn out to be metaphors.
                                 
1 The so-called Lacan’s thought-revolution, in my view, originates in the theory of existence. It reveals three stages or performance registers of the human existing drama, which have been kept intact in the field of psycho-analysis. They are not the divisions of registers, but three windows, i.e. imaginaire, symbolique and réel, as Lacan terms them respectively. Here Lacan refuses to use any conception nouns, instead, he refers to specifying adjectives. They are three powers in human activities. They are imago, signifier, and impossible réel. Actually they are at once interwoven and independent. Lacan takes them as orders in activities, which logically result in three orders, that is, imago order, signifier order and real order. We would like to make a comparison between Lacan’s three registers or his logic of study stages and Marx’s three-volume Capital, whose first volume accounts for the production and occurrence of self subjects; whose second, the construction and realization of the subject in language communication; whose third, totality of the subject existence and the factual reality.
These are the three life activities, which do not share their individual functional constructions of orders. They contrast with three negative objects, i.e. the three critical definitions Lacan used to put forward on the construction of individual subjects: first, Freud’s ego; second, the individual subject of new humanism  after Stirnner and Kierkegarrd; third, Heidegger’s non-fossilized true existence. Despite the fact that Lacan’s thory of the self is frequently referred to in quite a few writings, it seems that Lacan has never accepted any of the logic of constructivism, upon which he and Dali have come to agreement. Any descriptions illustrative of the three are ready to turn out to be a pseudo-theory of the self, a pseudo-theory of the subject, and an impossible truth of existence. Lacan appears to come up with a system corresponding to that of Freud’s personal identity, i.e. réel is in place of self; imaginaire, ego; symbolique, superego. But this is quite untrue. This is no such simple relations of replacement. Lacan sees the existence of the individual subject in actual life. But he goes further to the background of the existence and accounts for what it is composed of. This reminds us of Zeno of Elea’s arguments against motion, which precipitated a crisis in Greek thought. An arrow cannot move at a place at which it is not. But neither can it move at a place at which it is. But a flying arrow is always at the place at which it is. That is, at any instant it is at rest. But if at no instant is it moving, then it is always at rest. Lacan postulates that Freud’s personal identity, ego, has never come into being, that human psycho-ego is constructed in imaginaire relative to the other, and that the narcissistic stage is the grabbing absorption in the other. It is true that the socialized adult subject takes its place in a network of linguistic and social roles in an equal and non-grabbing way. And yet it is degraded as a slave of linguistic system of imaginaire, i.e. the unconscious attachment of signifier (the other, capitalized).
It is beyond doubt that Lacan’s revolution is not just abstract negation or criticism. He contributes in the process of overturning, which does not necessarily mean the affirmation on the part of the new subject. Lacan’s revolution goes far beyond the academic stage of Freud’s psycho-analysis. What he overturns is the view of the individual subject of new humanism in the whole contemporary western world. He directly negates Heidegger’s postulation of real existence, which is no more than a residue in the formalized network of imaginaire-symbolique. This thing comes to go with the ontological impossible in Kant’s context, which is not essentially diverged from Bloch’s existential “not yet”. It is existential impossible, which is real existence proper. Lacan’s logic sounds absurd, hard to decipher within commonsense logic or traditional philosophical discourse.
Here is one more important point to make. Lacan’s idea is not exactly the result of historical process in terms of time logic. He is said to put forward the theory of imaginaire in early times, to come up with the linguistic theory of signifier symbolique in the light of the structural approach to linguistics in 1963, and to establish the theory of real register in 1960. Authentically, Lacan’s thinking is fundamentally revolutionary at its very beginning. Generally speaking, Lacan’s thinking is not constructive, but critical and negative. And of course, his thinking develops in process of time. During 1936-1951, Lacan worked on his theory of icon, which is mainly composed of such logic elements as image-imago. Reflection, the other (back reference), and pseudo-self are among the key words of the time. From the point of theoretical logic, Lacan’s endeavor was to analyze the “self” in the light of genesis, which is opposed to that of constructivism (Piaget, for example). His work was intended to illustrate the virtual mis-identification and suicidal tragedy behind the real construction of the self. What is more, Lacan’s work is based on the ontological relation, which is negative. After 1953, Lacan explained the psudo-subject in light of the structural approach to linguistics. The signifier relation of symbolique became one of his main approaches, while the unconscious symbolique, signifier chain and the capitalized others are the key words in his discourse. It goes without saying that the underlying synchronic relationship is responsible for its logic medium. Lacan has paid more attention to the ontological study of his theory ever since 1960. He was beginning to focus on the impossible truth of existence, in which fantasy, desire, symptom and object petit a are among the key words. Until then, Lacan’s philosophy has gradually entered the context of mysticism.
Lacan’s philosophy is a profound critical theory of the subject of new humanism. He proposes to negate and de-construct the foundation of new humanism in the whole western philosophy of the time, and to subvert the existentialism based on individual subject after Stirnnerand Kierkegarrd. Lacan directly influenced Foucault, Althusser and Delueze. His philosophy becomes the cornerstone of de-subjectivization in modern French thought, and one of the theoretical foundations of post-modernism, new feminism and post-Marxism. He is noted for dismissing the re-confirming in favor of disconfirmation, as he argues against the re-construction of the subject. During the early days, Lacan claimed to follow phenomenology, but his study on the subject of “back to the thing” lead to the embarrassing death of the human ontological being. His endeavor was to criticize Freud’s ego in the dynamics of the mind, to refuse all the conceptions of the subject (mainly the individual subject of new humanism) after Descartes. And yet he did not intend to postulate any such a confirmation of real existence of the individual subject as Stirnner’s “the oneness”, Nietzsche’s “superman”, or Heidegger’s “truth of being”. Lacan takes human being as the Sisyphean absurdity in existentialism of his French countryman Camus. He calls the absurdity of individual existence the impossible of existence. His philosophy lies in the impossible, i.e. the truth of individual existence.
In the first place, Lacan is the first of the time to claim the death of individual subject “I”. It is Lacan who has murdered Stirnner’s oneness, so as to trap the ontological building of new humanism inaugurated by Kierkegaard, who erects the subjective philosophy of new humanism on the basis of the debris conception of species (absolute idea, essence and ensemble). While Stirnner proposes the death of that species of human in the reason of enlightenment, which results in Nietzsche’s “superman” and Heidegger’s “truth of being”, it should be noted that Lacan does not positively illustrate the history and the construction of individual subject, instead, he takes a negative approach to explain the falsity  of the constructed individual subject, which is just contrary to Piaget  logic of constructivism. As human being is born to be a void, and human growing is nothing but nothingness of icon (imagination) and society (symbol) situated in that void. Lacan’s viewpoint is influenced by Hegel’s philosophy explained by Kojeve, whose citation from Hegel attracted great numbers of French thinkers. The critical point is that what Lacan disconfirms, from the very beginning, has never been the virtual individual subject, nor the virtual process of the sensible life experience. What Lacan negates is existentialism of relationship after Marx, Heidegger and Hiromatsu Wataru.   Lacan’s critical revolution takes its firm root in ontological relationships. He proposes to point out that the construction of relation Gestaten in existentialism of individual subject proves to be a subverted existence in mis-identified formality. Marx argues that human is an ensemble of social relationships, which is basically a historical affirmation. But Heidegger has seen that is not a Thing, not a substance, not an object.   The being of human is a relation of behavior construction. Human is a being of relationship between historical synchronic and diachronic episodes. However, Lacan staunchly defends that all social-cultural constructions whose subjects are situated in these ontological relations are illusive. The ontological relations are those of alienation, which erase the real existence. Lacan has found that the relation ontology discovered by Marx and Heidegger is a misleading trap. He is terribly incisive as his object of criticism has never been ostensible.
In the second place, Lacan’s logic lies in the ultra-realistic negative relation ontology. If Heidegger says that “ Any exhibiting of an entity as it shows itself in itself, may be called “phenomenology” with formal justification.”,   Lacan would point out that phenomenology is an unconscious image as the emergence of the being itself depends upon the recognition by autre. As a result, what has been identified by Marx and Heidegger turns out to be an imaginaire-symbolique world created in posse by others, capitalized or not. Obviously, profound truth no longer lies in the entity of covering and uncovering proposed by Heidegger, and it proves to be the inescapable mis-identification led by others. This is a very important logic entrance. The existence of individual sensible experience does not get involved in Lacan’s icon-imaginaire relations, signifier-symbolique relations, authentic relations. It is identified in the context of ultra-realistic and ultra-entitative psychological existence. On this point, Lacan identifies the context of ultra-realism. The most important thing about human lies in the realistic relations beyond the worldly reality. Lacan goes further to find out that the transcendental idealism, which the avant-gardists pursue in imaginaire, symbolique relations, is nothing but alienation! His claim is destructive of all utopianism, aestheticism, and theology. In his eye, the individual “I” derives from the forced alienated self identification. Both the psychological construction of the “self” in the world and the subject confirmation in the tangled linguistic symbolique relations of social life are counted as an illusive kind of self-deceiving icon. It is bad faith   in Sartre’s term. Idealism generates self-deceiving.
In the third place, Lacan’s philosophy is a kind of existentialism of disconfirmation. As noted above, the logic of disconfirmation is the inner structure of Lacan’s philosophy. But as we all know, disconfirmation is first conceptualized in epistemology by Popper. With this, he overturns the whole traditional epistemology and the scientific judgment, and leads the axiom of science from confirmation to disconfirmation. Science is no longer simple statements of plausible evidences, and it becomes hypotheses with situated finite mis-identifications. Truth does not come from the coincidence between the fact and the idea verified by empirical evidence any more. It is a cognitive process, in which errors are recognized situated in historic knowledge. Science is not the “whole truth”. Any kind of knowledge must prove itself faulty before it enters the scientific process of thinking. The only truth is the faulty scientific knowledge. Lacan’s logic ushers in disconfirmism of existentialism. He subverts all the positive views on human being. Human beings cannot be such a subject as being all by itself. It is justified by slavish recognition by others – non-subject being. The earliest growth of individual psychological self steps foot on the imago-imaginaire road, because the pseudo-self basically originates only from the non-self icon, which leads to the establishment of symbolique register of subject by means of a signifier chain of violent usurpation. From the very beginning, human subject in culture is the pseudo-subject of the illusive capitalized others. Human being appears somewhere only in disconfirmation. In Lacan’s words, real things – object petit a  appears as a survival from a failed coincidence of symbolique register. The truth of being is nothing but the impossible of real existence.
Finally, a new unconscious principle of individual subject being gets at the core of Lacan’s philosophy. His unconsciousness is not that of intuition suppressed by the subject as Freud defined, but self-identification of the subject. In the stage of icon, the ego, constituted by young individual psychology, is merely a projective illusion of antecedent usurpation, acquired unconsciously, by way of icon (the image of autre I ). Others’ faces (image of autre II) compels the establishment of the unconscious imaginary identification in the deeper relations of individual ego. In symbolique register, the individual subject always enters the cultural existence of the antecedent language and social exchange. Here the signifier relation is the only approach to subject construction, in which, as a replacement and the symbolique of human being, the signifier chain becomes the unconscious dominant structure of the subject establishment, i.e. the capitalized others of antecedent existence. Lacan identifies the human unconsciousness in Freud, but this unconsciousness is a discourse by the capitalized others. At this moment, this unconsciousness has become the death of human being. It symbolizes the greatest antecedent aggressive violence. Human beings embrace this violence unconsciously and take the antecedent aggression as the most important existence in themselves. What a shame! If we used to feel miserable due to the fact, uncovered by Freud, that self-consciousness should be supported by unconsciousness, we would now be in a desperate mood due to human unconsciousness at root.

2 Ontologically, Lacan’s philosophy is a kind of critical existing dialects. He subverts the actual logic of existentialism. In Heidegger, relative to the outer deterministic projection, the self being Dasein is Entwurf, a kind of active antecedence£¬while the projection in Lacan is just a kind of self-deceiving. What we think as our own intention and ideal is merely the unconscious result manipulated by others. To Become what you are  means to become what others make you to be. Thus, Heidegger’s Being towards Death, Sein zum Tode is no longer poetic since the truth is more dead than alive. For Heidegger, the past, present and future are indivisible trinity within one time continuum. In his dialectic, lost in the making present of the “today”, it (the “they”) understands the ‘past’ in terms of the ‘Present’.   While the authentic being, from the point of the “future”, which enables the authentic antecedence of the being to entertain Vorhabe . To determine itself as an entity, Dasein always does so in the light of a possibility which it is itself and which, in its very Being, it somehow understands.  The future means that we have in view the coming [Kunft] in which Dasein, in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, comes towards itself. Anticipation makes Dasein authentically futural, …    With this, the future means the antecedence in Heidegger. Dasein, existing authentically, lets itself come towards itself as its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. But in Lacan, the possibility of antecedence (should) be the violence of autre. The self antecedence has become an evil past-existence of non-subject. This is a kind of pseudo-antecedence. Lacan claims —— What is realized in my history is not the past definite of what was, since it is no more, or even the present.   This seems to be a repetition of Heidegger’s time dialectic, but here Lacan uses the “antecedent future” to refer to Vorsicht ,with which the subject is provided by non-capitalized autre (faces of others and projective images) in the stage of icon. However, in the symbolique register, it is Vorgriff  by the capitalized others before the reified things and individual subjects. In this conception, Lacan actually denies the resources of human culture, as the origin of civilization stems from concept (species, essence and “oneness”). With this, Lacan denies the antecedence of species to the individuals, that of essence to the phenomena, and that of “oneness” to the mass. This is terrorism in ontology.
  However, it should be noted that the antecedence in Lacan is derogative. The antecedence means the “subject” given by icon, not the false subject witnessed by the antecedence of the Being. It means the nomination of dead objective things and void subject by the symbolique signifier. Lacan’s antecedence is not any of the usurping, violent pseudo-antedecence by others. The ontological usurpation is extremely critical. As Lacan says, the primary “I” is a void, which (Es) is usurped successively by the image of capitalized and non-capitalized autre. Therefore, the subject is established upon void with a vacuum. On this point, Sartre is ironically understood to the contrary. Sartre locates the essence of individual existence in the capacity of transcendental project. Human deny themselves being. The non-transcendental possible (void) generates capacity of activity. The characteristic of selfness (Selbstheit), in fact, is that man is always separated from what he is by all the breadth of the being which he is not. . Here Sartre puts forward the concept that man always separates from what he is to mean the positive transcendental possibility. And yet Lacan finds human to be always separated from the true existence of the self. Human are no themselves.
  We venture to make a judgment here: Lacan re-overturns Bloch, if Bloch’s principle of hope is the “negative existentialism”. Human exist, but never ever as themselves. Human is no more than a slave of others’ unconsciousness. But what makes it worse is that human thought themselves to be independent individuals, who are the subjects full of passion and thought. Dasein is an entity which in each case I myself; its Being is in each case mine.   These are all crazy. Lacan claims that he would bring about an “earthquake” to the world of thought centering on individual subjects.
  Lacan sees through the essence of existential antecedence and identifies in it the aggressiveness (agressivité) occurring at the level of the underlying psychological unconsciousness. To us, aggressiveness is a kind of compelling, which is a “sweet power”, and is different from external violence. This might make the term difficult. Let’s turn to Lacan’s explanations. Lacan holds that aggressiveness, at its earliest stage, is a correlative tension of the narcissistic structure in the coming-into-being (devenir) of the subject.  It involves in the primary self constraints caused by the objective recognition in the process of the “self” construction, or we might call it repression. Lacan has a somber metaphor for this repression: intended aggressivity gnaws away, undermines, disintegrates; it castrates; it leads to death.   This judgment is rather claim that aggressiveness should be an extremely important question in the sense of existentialism. He believes that we could, as an individual subject, measure this repression in great numbers of others’ subconscious symptoms.

In the implicit finality of his behaviour and his rejections, in his unsuccessful acts, in the avowal of his privileged phantasies, and in the riddles of his dream life.
In the demanding tone that sometimes underlies his whole discourse, in his unfinished sentences, his hesitations, his inflexions and his slips of the tongue, in the inaccuracies of his descriptions of events, irregularities in his application of the analytic rule, late arrivals at sessions, calculated absences, and often in recriminations, reproaches, phantasmic fears, emotional reactions of anger, attempts at intimidation. 

What is Lacan seeking after? As a matter of fact, he intends to illustrate the unconscious repressions that has never departed from the subjects. The unconscious repressions, as Lacan sees them, derive from the self-identification at the early stage of psychological construction. Owing to the temporary stagnation brought about by the image in the icon in the earlier impotent existence, the antecedent non-capitalized others occupy the position of the self with the void, and the false “self” starts an antecedent kind of aggressiveness upon individual existence proper. It is unfortunate that not only human fail to recognize the repressions, but also go further to take the aggressive repressions as free will. The antecedent aggressiveness becomes the internal logic of individual subject existence at all stages by contraries. Exactly in this sense, Lacan has found the fantastic structure of the subject existence, or human madness, to put it in a general word. Human exist because they come into being in other places as others. There must be aggressiveness even in the aggressivity it releases in any relation to the other, even in a relation involving the most Samaritan of aid.   Human cannot exist without the intervention of others’ aggressiveness. This is the essential part of aggressiveness.
Lacan proceeds to raise the aggressiveness to social existence. He holds that the essence of all the subject culture is the aggressiveness, which the antecedent others forced upon the concrete objects and individuals. This is the foundation of all our civilization. Lacan postulates that the aggressiveness is of vital importance in our civilization. In this way, Lacan locates the moral truth of civilization in the underlying repressions. This is a new approach to Lacan. Traditional morality is supported directly by external repressions, while the morality in modern civilization of the west is a kind of self-discipline. Lacan coincides with Foucault on this point. Thus, Lacan claims,

Before Darwin, however, Hegel had provided the ultimate theory of the proper function of aggressivity in human ontology, seeming to prophecy the iron law of our time. From the conflict of Master and Slave, he deduced the entire subjective and objective progress of our history, revealing in these crises the syntheses to be found in the highest forms of the status of the person in the West, from the Stoic to the Christian, and even to the future citizen of the Universal State.  

Lacan thinks that all his endeavor is to expose the deeply underlying aggressiveness, especially, to reveal what he claims to be the aggressivity that underlies the activity of the philanthropist, the idealist, the pedagogue, and even the former.  

Lacan proceeds from the analyses of aggressiveness in terms of ontology to the zenith of epistemological criticism. In his opinion, the subject is made to the objective image (Freud’s “narcissism”) by symbolique relations, which is a special kind of recognition model. It is formal stagnation, as Lacan calls it. 
This formal stagnation is similar to the most general structure of human knowledge, which constitutes the subject and its object with such properties as eternity, identity and entity. To put it in a simple way, it is the structure, which is constituted with entity or the form of “thing”. These things are different in essence from the Gestalt diverged from the changed scene, which is developed in accordance with animal desire.   Now, this formal stagnation is akin to the most general structure of human knowledge: that which constitutes the ego and its objects with attributes of permanence, identity, and substantiality, in short, with entities or ‘thing’ that are very different from the Gestalten that experience enables us to isolate in the shifting field, stretched in accordance with the lines of animal desire. It is in this context that Lacan claims that the essence of all human knowledge is a terrible kind of impossible usurpation. The system of knowledge based on the symbolique conception is involved in the process, in which the fossilized thing takes the place of the fresh existence. What’s worse, the self-conceited system of knowledge identifies self existence. It fails to realize that in the process of objective materialization. In fact, this formal fixation, which introduces a certain rupture of level, a certain discord between man’s organization and his Umwelt I, is the very condition that extends indefinitely his world and his power, by giving his objects their instrumental polyvalence and symbolic polyphony, and also their potential as defensive armour. And therefore, the passionate desire peculiar to man to impress his image in reality is the obscure basis of the rational mediations of the will.   Lacan holds that human knowledge is another form of Paranoiac   Without doubt, Lacan does not mean to confirm the rebel of Dali and transcendental realism, and, instead, he implies the primary violence of unrealistic omniscience in human reason. The truth as the object of epistemology, is explained by Lacan in this way -- Truth is nothing other than that which knowledge can apprehend as knowledge only by setting its ignorance to work   

3 It is often said that Lacan, under the influence of transcendental realism and Hegel’s master/slave dialectic, introduces structural approach to linguistics into psycho-analysis, and develops a philosophical kind of critical metaphysics. It is justifiable to take up this stand within a great background of thought. Nevertheless, most philosophers neglect one of the most critical questions: Lacan’s thought could not be ready at hand. None of the others’ ideas can enter his thought positively without revolutionary overturn or subversion, which has made the relationships between Lacan and his thought overwhelmingly complicated. In reality, we are supposed to point out some important elements in his internal thought before approaching Lacan’s context. They are transcendental realism as Lacan’s thought propellant, Dali as Lacan’s thought icon, Hegel’s master/slave dialectic as Lacan’s philosophical stage, the theory of the other as Lacan’s core subject, Saussure and structuralism as Lacan’s conception resources, and Bataille philosophy as Lacan’s background for the truth register of existence. It should also be noted that Lacan’s philosophical thought is strongly supported by Husserl’s intuitive conception in phenomenology and Heidegger’s existential ontology in time.   In short, these would be Lacan’s genealogy of philosophical logic in terms of history, with which we would find a way out from the labyrinth of Lacan.
The first is the relationship between Lacan and transcendental realism. The poetic power in Lacan’s thought, including his famous Écrits, comes from transcendental realism. It is justifiable to say so. Nevertheless, transcendental realists are in no way than one coincident with Lacan in expressing the world of unconsciousness by way of subverting works of art, which slave the reality with ideas, in replacing the dull, mundane day-to-day life by fantastic cosmos, and in creating the realistic life situation, which goes beyond transcendental realism. Lacan is excited with the artistic subversion by transcendental realism. As Dali, he comes to oppose the positive constructivism. But he does not follow the Breton’s Soul Revolution towards the other side, nor does he consider that the individualistic route of Dali is his theoretical stage. Lacan is concerned with the realistic life proper abandoned by transcendental realism. He purports to expose how the pseudo-world of realism (, whose core discourse is the relationship of master rights displayed by the individual subject) has been self-deceivingly constructed. Lacan makes brilliant use of the internal logic inertia of transcendental realism and uncovers a more profound academic stage of another kind.
The second is the relationship between Lacan and Hegel’s master/slave dialectic, which has been mediated by new Hegelianism. It goes without saying that all things such as the Hegel, “fried” by Kierkegaard’s existentialism, especially his self-consciousness, i.e. desire, the back denotation relationship established by self-consciousness and his other dialectic in the relationship of master and slave have become the foundation of Lacan’s philosophical logic. However, Hegel’s view that man is a night has been transmuted into the expression that man is a void. The desire of individual subject (including Dali’s realistic desire in fantasy) is diminished to non-realistic object controlled by others’ unconsciousness, while another relationship confirmed by the icon of self-consciousness is negatively denoted as fantastic mis-recognition. What’s more important, the reflex relationship subverted in the object labor in Hegel’s master/slave dialectic loses all its realistic foundation of history in Lacan. What Hegel considers to be the absolute concept of world essence is asserted to be tyrants of underlying capitalized autre. It is the concept of autre   re-illuminated by Levinas’s philosophy that is divided into capitalized and non-capitalized autre, whose essential logic intention is already subverted by Lacan.
  The third is the relationship between Lacan and linguistic structuralism, the most important and complicated relationship of theory. Lacan’s works and researches happen in the heyday of linguistic structuralism, which leads to a simplistic description that Lacan introduces structuralism into Freud’s psycho-analysis of structuralism. This description proves Lacan’s definition of truth: we reach truth in the process of mis-identification. To be exact, Lacan utterly rejects structuralism. In terms of the off-center intention of disconfirmation subject, Lacan and structuralism share the same route, but in terms of in terms of the structure of subject replacement (the “form” of Russian formalism, Prague functional system of language ) in structuralism, Lacan is fully justified to be the capitalized other. All things considered, the starting-point of Lacan and Derrida’s early thinking are of the homogeneity.
  The final point is the relationship between Lacan and his theoretical father Freud. What Lacan claims from time to time is “a return to Freud”. He regards his academic life as “the cause of Freud”. To the contrary, Lacan is found to subvert Freud on his way back to Freud. Some scholars are justifiably convinced that Lacan actually intends to go back to young Freud, especially his theory of unconsciousness. In Althusser’s term, Lacan starts ideological criticism and cognitive clarification of Freud’s theory (Lenin and Philosophy). Later Lacan admitted, A return to Freud is ween as a reversal.   The relationship between Lacan and Freud is an important logic route, by which “a return to Freud” could be expressed in famous Lacan’s over-illumination. 
Lacan often refers to Freud’s later expression ( sometimes he calls it the last will of Freud ,which Freud  in 1932:  Wo Es war, soll Ich warden £¡   Freud makes it clear that where there is intuitive id, there is manipulative ego. Earnest Jones put it into English: “Where the id was, there the ego shall be”. Here the pronoun “Es”(which should be literally translated into “It”) is translated into “Id”, and “Ich”(which should be literally translated into “I”), “Ego”. Marie Bonaparte puts it into simple French: “Le moi doit déloger le ça”. As a matter of fact, the two versions cannot be counted as misinterpretation as far as Freud’s own context is concerned. But Lacan finds serious problems with them. He points out that Freud fails to use the definite article “das” on purpose because of his “special implications”:

Wo (Where) Es (the subject –devoid of any das or other objectivating article) war (was –it is a locus of being that is reffered to here, and that in this locus) soll(must –that is, a duty in the moral sense, as is confirmed by the single sentence that follows and brings the chapter to a close) Ich (I, there must I –just as one declared, ‘this am I’, before saying, ‘it is I’) werden (become –that is to say, not occur (survenir), or even happen (advenir), but emerge (venir au jour) from this very locus in so far as it is a locus of being).  

Lacan interprets the famous saying by Freud in this way: ‘There where it was’ (‘Là où c’était’), I would like it to be understood, ‘it is my duty that I should come to being’.   Lacan proposes very complicated meanings. But we are convinced that Lacan intentionally misunderstand Freud. He rejects Freud’s intuitive id, which is ontologically void in Lacan. It has never been present, id is, therefore, “it”, which should have existed but has never present itself. It is a void in reality. Id is a false self composed of a series of alienated identifications, which refers to the adolescent individual subject constituted fictitiously by others’ icon reflection. It is more unfortunate of individual subject, who gets into cultural linguistic relationships. It is no more than a symbolique relation identified by capitalized autre. Therefore, Lacan deliberately takes the first letter S(ujet), which has the same sound as German “Es” (it), as the form of absolute subject, which does not present “it” itself. S is merely not where it should be, instead of where it used to be. Now “I” am present at that place, and subject S is dead, which is unknown to itself.  He is ignorant of his death. S will put on a slash, and will become S. This is a terrible kind of alienation of alienation. Or it 

Becomes doubly alieanting, for not only is the subject’s handiwork taken from him by another –which is the constituting relation of all labour – but the subject’s recognition of his own essence in his handiwork, in which this labour finds its justification, also eludes him, for he himself ‘is not in it’. He is in the anticipated moment of the master’s death, from which moment he will begin to live, but in the meantime he identifies himself with the master as dead, and as a result of this he is himself already dead.  
    
This is no longer the Freud as it used to be. Lacan kills him. It is in the death of his theoretical father of capitalized autre that Lacan realizes his revolution.
If Heidegger’s existentialism attempts to get rid of the state of the traditional subject philosophy that it has no ground of its own to stand on   through Dasein present in the historical time, Lacan explores that individual existence (historical Dasein) lies in the reality of rootlessness. Freud’s revolution is a stark illustration of Descartes’s theory of rational subject. I myself am not the master of my own house. Lacan claims that man is always homeless. Ego and subject do not exit without phantom and self-deceiving up to a point. Since there is authentic existence, Holderlin-Heidegger’s nostalgia dies out.