The Subjective Dimension of Marxian Historical Dialectics

Zhangyibing

Abstract

Marxian theory of quasi-naturalness and object-enslavement about the phenomena coming forth in a definite historical period of human social development, which is pointed out by this book, is a significant content of the logical subject dimension of historical dialectics in Marxist scientific view of history, but for quite a long time this important scientific and critical discourse of Marx has always been overlooked. The following important doctrine is advanced and demonstrated de novo by the writer of this book whose study is based on a careful reading of a great quantity of classical literature: the development of human society and history, which is not always a natural historical process, unfolds itself as a historical phenomenon something like blindfold movement of nature only in a definite level of the function degree of the human social practice; in this specific historical period human subject becomes aberrant as the slave of external forces(nature and human materialized world), and the development of the social history becomes “a process without subject” similar to natural historical movement; the quasi-naturalness and object-enslavement of this specific social history is not an eternal order of nature, and with the development of human social practice the human kind will surpass this historical existential status in the end, i.e., making for the period of human all-round free development----realm of freedom from the pre-historical period of human social development----realm of necessity. Furthermore the writer discussed the modern signification of the this doctrine of Marx from the theoretical perspective of contemporary thought history and the view of natural science, especially from the combination with the socialist praxis possessing Chinese characteristics. This book, which has a new and deep implication and an uppermost expression in such aspects as initiative thoughts and contextual mutual-motion, as history distinguishing and tractatus, as logical penetration and simple lifelikeness, and as theoretical research and reality reflection, is a creative and infrequent writing in the investigation of Marxist fundamental theory recent years.           
   

Content

Preface                                                    Sun Bokui
Author’s Preface for Second Edition
Author’s Preface
Introduction A General Logical Clew of the Theory of Social Historical Development Process ahead of Marx
Chapter I   Subject Dialectics in the Philosophical Circumstance of Youth Marx
  Section 1 Human Essence is to Surpass the Restriction of the Nature
1. Self-transcendence and Creativity of Human Subject
2. “New World Originated from Spirit”
3. “Indecent Materialism”
  Section 2 Eradication of the Logical Contradiction behind the Perversion of Subject-Object
1. Returning to the Basis: “Perverted World” and “Perverted Weltanschauung”
2. Requiring Domination: Man is Ultimate of the World
  Section 3  Economic Alienation: Man is the Slave of Their Own Creation
1. Theoretical Constitution of Economic Alienation : Money is the Essence Alienated from Man 
2. Quadruple Alienation of the Essence of Human Subject Labor
3. Communism: Humanism Completed in the Sense of Subject
4. An Important Theory Distinguishing
Chapter II  Social Historical Development Process and Human Subject within the New Circumstance of Philosophy
    Section 1 Logical Gestalt Transformation in Philosophical Revolution
1. Three Puzzles in the Philosophical Logic of Marx
2. The Initial Deconstruction of Marxian Logical Gestalt about Labor Alienation
3. New Footstone for Theory: Objective Materialization Praxis from Human Positive Subject
Section 2 Natural Process and Social Historical Process within the New Philosophical Circumstance
1. Die Deutsche Ideologie: Initial Circumstance of New Weltanschauung
2. Human Natural Environment mediated by Human Subject Praxis
3. The Essence and the Operational Mechanism of Human Social Historical Process
4. The Two-time Important Expression on the Principle of Scientific History Vision
5. Objectification of Scientific Materialist Logic: A Brief Summary about a Brief Summary
Section 3 Human Subject Situation within the Circumstance of Practical Historical Dialectics
1. The Error of the Humanist History View
2. What is the Real Man in the New Philosophical Circumstance?
3. Is it a kind of fact that Marx and Engels Don’t Pay any More Attention to the Existential Status of Human Subject?
4. “Autonomous Activity”: A New Scientific Yardstick to Measure the Situation of Subject
5. “Communism is not the Ideal Status Which Should be Established”
Chapter III The Real Content of Marxian Specifically-Posited Determination on the Quasi-naturalness and Object-enslavement of Social History
  Section 1  The Absence of the Subject Dimension of Historical Dialectics and the Misunderstanding to Marx
1. The Double Structure of Historical Materialist View as the Premise of Marxian Economic Investigation
2. The Re-distinguishing of the Relationship between the Natural Historical Process and the Development of Human Social History
3. Is the Development of Human Social History Always a Natural Historical Process?
  Section 2  Quasi-naturalness: The Development of Social History is alienated as the Special Historical Status of Natural Historical Process 
1. Marxian Different Semantic Layers of “Nature” and “the Order of Nature”
2. Theoretical Outset: The Refutation of Capitalist “Eternal Order of Nature”
3. Semantic Metonymy: The Specific “Order of Nature” in the Productive Process of Capitalism
4. In What Sense is the Development of Social History Similar to Natural Process?
  Section 3   Object-enslavement and Quasi-naturalness
1. Objectification versus Alienation and Materialization versus Object-enslavement
2. The Phenomenon of Object-enslavement: We are impelled by the Force of the Object Created by Ourselves
3. The Fundamental Aspects in Which Object-enslavement takes Place in the Social Process of Capitalism
  Section 4  Fetishism: Man falls on his Knees in front of the Human Creations
1. The Essence of Fetishism is the Ideology of Bourgeoisie
2. Marxian Critique of Three Fetishisms
3. The Phenomenon of Economic Force Dominating Man is the Perpetual Law of History?
Chapter IV Re-cognition of the Total Process of Human Social Historical Development
   Section 1  Marxian Theory of Social History Division and Quasi-naturalness
1. The Two Logical Perspectives in Marxian Theory of Social History Division
2. The Different Historical Period in Marxian Objective Logic of Description
3. Marxian Theory of Three Social Modalities versus Quasi-naturalness and Object-enslavement
Section 2  The Profound Signification of Transformation from “Realm of Necessity” to “Realm of Freedom”
1. Realm of Necessity: The Necessity of Freedom and that of Economy
2. Realm of Freedom: Self-realization and Emancipation of Human Subject
3. The Historical Leap from “Realm of Necessity” to “Realm of Freedom”
4. Transcend Object-enslavement: The Human Existential Status in the Future Communist Society
Chapter V  Engels and Social Historical Dialectics
Section 1   Man and Nature in the Eyes of Youth Engels
1. “Phoenix Flying from Flames”
2. Seizure of “ Historical Activity”
3. Returning the Content of History to History
Section 2  The Single Scale to Observe the Society: Social Praxis Prism
1. Marx and Engels Who Create Scientific Weltanschauung Together
2. The Order of Nature is Becoming Historical Law Step by Step
3. The Natural Prospect Centered by the Earth
Section 3  Quasi-naturalness, Object-enslavement and Autonomous Activity of Human Praxis
1. The Similarities and Differences between the Development of Social History and that of Natural History
2. The Abnormal Phenomenon of the External Necessity Dominating Human Subject
3. Making for the Realm of Freedom from the Realm of Necessity
    Section 4  The Re-interpretation of “Composite Force” Doctrine of Engels’ Social Historical Vision
1. The Authentic Appearance of Engels’ “Composite Force” Doctrine
2. The “Composite Force” Doctrine is a Specific Historical Determination
Chapter VI    Western Marxism and Social Historical Dialectics
    Section 1  The Internal Logical Conflict in the Social Historical Theory of Contemporary Western Marxism
1. The Transcendence of Subject: Against Economic Determinism
2. Anti-human “Process Without Subject”: The Historical Reaction of Scientism
3. The Deconstruction of Logical Polarity: A Theoretical Recognition
4. A Specifically-posited Explanation
Section 2   “Humanist” Marxism and the Theory of Quasi-naturalness
1. The Consideration on Heterogeneity of the Relations between Social Development and Natural Process
2. The Critique of Capitalist “Order of Nature”
3. The Ideological Myth of “Nativism”
Section 3  “Humanist” Marxism and the Theory of Object-enslavement
1. Lukacs’s Critique of the “Materialization” of Non-subject
2. Lukacs’s Critique of the “Rationality” of Science and Technology
3. Frankfurt School: Instrumental Reason and the Ideology of Science and Technology
4. An Analysis and a Summary
Chapter VII  Modern Natural Science and Marxian Social Historical Dialectics
Section 1   Modern Scientific Revolution and Marxist Historical Vision
1. Modern Scientific Revolution and Marxist Philosophical Revolution
2. Modern Scientific Production and Marxist Historical Dialectical Investigation
Section 2  The Self-organization Theory of Complexity Science and Historical Dialectics
1. The General Evolutionism of the Self-organization Theory of Complexity Science
2. What a Kind of Self-organization Process is the Evolution of Human Social History?
3. The Self-organization of Social Evolution and Quasi-naturalness
Section 3   Contemporary Ecological Circumstance and the Deep-seated Logic of Marxian Historical Dialectics
1. The Logical Intention of Contemporary Ecological Circumstance
2. Marxian Social Historical Dialectics and Ecology
3. The Control of Human Social Subject Action and Quasi-naturalness
4. Realistic Distinguishing of the Relationship between Man and Nature
Chapter VIII   Contemporary Socialist Praxis and Historical Dialectics
Section 1   The Historical Reflection of Socialist Practical Way
1. A Philosophical Introspection on Socialist Practical Process
2. The Philosophical Logic of Mao Tsedong’s and the Revolutionary Practical Way
3. A Perspective on Mao Tsedong’s Exploration of the Socialism Possessing “Chinese Characteristics”
Section 2   Philosophical Consideration on Deng Xiaoping’s Socialist Way Possessing Chinese Characteristics
1. The Double Structure of the Logic of Deng Xiaoping’s Practical Materialist Historical Dialectics
2. Three Successively-advanced Layers of the Recognition Process of  Deng Xiaoping’s Socialism Possessing Chinese Characteristics
3. The Economic Development in Socialist Primary Stage is a Natural Historical Process
Postscript
Leading Bibliography

Preface to the second edition

    For a person engaged in academic study, nothing is more gratifying than learning that his ideas has attracted interest or want understanding and criticizing yet. Naturally, I was greatly gratified at the republication of The Subjective Dimension of Marxist Historical Dialectics completed in 1993.
In retrospect, when I started composing the book over ten years ago, I was in the middle of the experimental ideological process of “back to a real Marx.” By then I had surely read all the works of both Marx and Engels more than once and even reaped initial benefits of textual study of such treatises as Lenin’s “Philosophical Notes” and Marx’s The German Ideology, but I had neither noticed the latest data group of MEGA2 (the second edition of Die Marx Engels Gesamtausgabe) nor truly developed my unique historical approach to textual study. Although I insisted on “getting rid of the traditional framework of philosophical interpretation” and had some specialized opinions on Marxian theories on natural history, my theoretical discourse was, deep in theoretical framework, ultimately trapped in the old system. That may be what Polanyi called focal awareness and implicit paradox in the context of support. In order to make it clear, I would like to start with a brief review of my philosophical thinking and study.
It might be remembered that in the late 1970s, corresponding to the political correction, the domestic academia tried its best to banish the haze the full-scale ten-year calamity had brought to people’s mind as well. Unsatisfied with the “left” ideological opinions, quite many scholars appealed to the reversion from “the philosophy of struggle” that the Gang of Four threw into disorder to Marxist philosophical system before “the Cultural Revolution,” which can be considered as the theoretical “radical reform,” or as it were, a kind of clarification. However, shortly afterwards in 1982, at a seminar on “Modern Natural Science and Marxist Epistemology” held in Guilin, seven academics from Department of Philosophy of Fudan University, Shanghai such as Yu Wujin and Wu Xiaoming submitted an outline on Marxist epistemology in which they raised enlightening questions in the Marxist philosophical world at that time: Is the so-called “original Marxist” that we once considered absolutely correct and tried to “revert to” exactly a stagnant system? Does it need to develop further in the face of new achievements in natural science and western philosophy? You can imagine what a great shock those questions beyond conventional thinking has brought to Chinese scholars including me. It can even rank among the significant “events” in Chinese philosophical circles in the early 1980s. Though the event later ended against all expectations, it is a chance for me to develop a new line of thought. 
Another thing that struck me deeply was the several vigorous study groups on “the modernization of philosophy” that Institute of Philosophy of Chinese Academy of Social Science took the lead in holding in 1985. Going through three rounds, the study groups spread from Beijing to other places. The participants consisted of nearly all the young and middle-aged scholars in the whole Chinese philosophical academia of the time. Certainly, “the modernization of philosophy” here particularly denoted the modernization of Marxist philosophy in a context related to Deng Xiaoping’s “Three Orientations” of education. The lectures were mostly given by some well-known scholars from Institute of Philosophy of Chinese Academy of Social Science and academia of Beijing, covering significant development in both natural and social science of the day. Through the long duration of study, with no exception every lecture led off with such extreme remarks: “The thirty-year continuous Soviet Stalinist system has far lagged behind reform and development. Confronted with new achievements in natural science and the situation of reform and opening-up, philosophy is supposed to be modernized.” But actually, the main purpose and study approach of all the lectures were nothing but injecting some new concepts into the original theoretical system. In spite of that, such practice was of revoluntionary significance and theoretical charm at that time.
It was impacted by both above that I was determined to devote myself to “the modernization” of Marxist philosophy at one time.
First of all, I paid great attention to the discussion on such newborn disciplines as methodology of natural science and modern cognitive science and was so keen on the attempt to modernize Marxism by grafting such new ideas on natural science as system theory and science of complexity onto the fundamental principles of “Marxism” (acutally the explanation of traditional textbooks) that I even published a series of articles in which many new terms like “field of practice,” “pattern of practice,” “construction of practice,” and “functionality of practice” were coined. However, the further my study went on, the harder I felt it to expand the theoretical dimension. The difficulty does not lie in technique but precisely in the shake of “Marxism” which I considered as established foundations because Marxian theories that we were always thinking “at hand” can not actually in logical depth be immediatedly connected with contemporary natural science that has profoundly changed in quality. Such embarrassment in theoretical logic obliged me reexamine the former classical systematic philosophy that was firmly believed to be equal to “Marxism.” I must make it clear whether something is really wrong with Marxian theories, which is tantamount to my doubts about solidity of the theoretical basis under my own foot (I knew well that once my doubts were proved right, the illegitimacy of all classical bases of Marxism would be declared. Neither other scholars, especially those of the older generation who devoted their life to the theories, nor I was willing to see such a result. However, truth is always being presented in its own way even if the way is too ruthless as far as its accepters are concerned).
I found, after in-depth study, that the validity of the textbook system of former Soviet and Eastern European pattern we inherited and added Chinese characteristics to, or at least the validity of its basis had been an unproved presupposition within the sphere of discourse in the whole Chinese Marxist academia since the founding of our Pelople’s Republic. In people’s mind, the edifice of Marxian theories had been completed by former Soviet and Eastern European scholars (who owned first-hand literature). Our task was no more than adding something with Chinese characteristics to the construction to elaborate on and complement details. The so-called modernity and modernization of Marxist philosophy referred to nothing but the external joining of the fundamental principles of the existing systematic philosophy, new concepts of natural science and contemporary western philosophical culture. Thus, the “new development” of Marxist philosophy within such a presupposition tended to be the reproduction of new concepts plus the reorganization of subsystems within some existing system. However, self-evident presuppositions in theoretical logic sometimes exactly deserves to be questioned. My realization came that basic Marxist theories is really not a problem solved and not only one that develops in a simple way. The development of Marxist philosophy in the previous prejudiced views of dogmatism, whether Marxist philosophy is combined with the latest natural science, western philosophy and trend of thought in present society or the reality of Chinese reform, necessarily leads to either a weirder theoretical product or bypassing Marxism thoroughly. If that is served as the truth of Marxism to guide the practice of reform, you can imagine what the result is. I am fully confident that facing the new social reality and academic problems in earnest, above all, calls for a thorough and detailed examination of Marxian historical Circumstance, which is also my motive for “going back to a real Marx” suddenly in the last few years.
Next, I encountered a greater blow when I set foot in the study of Marxism in the middle and late 1980s. In 1990I published a booklet entitled Broken Wings of Reason—Criticism of Western Marxism (Nanjing Publishing House, 1990), from which, however, my stronger academic unease started. In the book I assumed the airs of criticizing scholars of Western Marxism from a right standpoint of Marxism, discussing all their faults. Nevertheless, I felt indescribable embarrassment in my heart of hearts. As an academic school of “Marxism,” a considerable number of exponents of Western Marxism made it their theoretical logic to graft various modern western trend of philosophical and cultural thought onto Marxism, constructing a variety of radical opposed discourse outside the mainstream of modern bourgeois academia, which is exactly based on elaborate interpretation of Marxist classics. As I pointed out, “Like the young Lukacs’s understanding of Marx’s Capital and the Critique of Political Economy prior to his writing History and Class Consciousness, Fromm’s study of the young Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts in 1844 when writing Marxian Concept of the Human, and Carl Schmitt’s cognition of Marx’s Economic Manuscripts during 1857 and 1858 when composing Marxian Concept of Nature, Louis Althusser’s Reading Capital is, as far as it goes, a considerable accomplishment in textual study.”  Regardless of their underlying framework of interpretation that was proved to be potentially false, if we did not personally study Marxian texts carefully that scholars of Western Marxism had carefully studied but simply focused on their explicit conclusion, it would be difficult to judge whether they were right or wrong accurately. As a consequence, after introspection I realized the validity of my “criticism” was doubtful. Accordingly I further take the position that the Circumstance of criticizing Western Marxism remains to be broaden in both depth and extent until our own accomplishments are enhanced, which, likewise, requires us to fulfil the historic task of “going back to a real Marx.”
Thirdly, in order to avoid facing such a academic dilemma we have another option for escaping from it; that is, we can simply declare classical “dialectical materialism and historical materialism” is out of date, independently procure new systematic philosophy without clarifying the historical Circumstance of Marxist philosophy, and then act on our own within the system rather than get access to Chinese social changes and the contemporary world culture “face to face”. That is really a gross deception, which is described in my academic practice as “practical materialism” I once approved. Although I later found it actually an unsuccessful production still under the profound influence of systematic philosophy, at that time I was excited at it for quite a long time and spared no effort to speak highly of it, asserting to what a large extent the expression of “practical materialism” is a great reform. But soon I was aware that even with the same slogan of constructing “practical materialism” the theoretical orientations expressed by different exponents were widely divergent. What is more, people could establish various new systems at their pleasure, for instance, “humanism,” “quasi-philosophy” or “practical humanism,” and then simply designate the systematic philosophy as “the present form of Marxist philosophy.” My question is: Is there any authentic grounds for such designation? Are they just expressing their own philosophical ideas in the name of Marxism? The introspection is adequate to prevent me from making such theoretical arrogation as the systematic philosophy called “the present form of Marxist philosophy” any more.
By then I had recognized that I still had a superficial and one-sided grasp of Marxist philosophy as a whole. If we want to be competent to communicate with “the present age,” introduce Marxism to the present age, and respond to as well as solve new problems in the proper perspective, one historic task to be accomplished is to clarify afresh the Circumstance of Marxist theories. Though I had expected it is likely to be a tremendous theoretical project, what happened were still far beyond my expectation.
     In the late 1980s I began to make a systematic study of Marxian texts. But by the beginning of writing the present book, I had not found an independent way of thinking to accomplish such a theoretical project. Despite my definite rejection of the traditional framework of philosophical interpretation, what attracted my greater attention is a dispute on specific academic opinions rather than new approaches to interpretation or heterogeneous Circumstance of study (which was achieved in the later Back to Marx—the Philosophical Discouse in the Context of Economics).  To be specific, what I focused on was a key issue in the study of historical materialism that I showed an interest in as early as in the middle 1980s, that is to say, some fatal misinterpretation in the conventional understanding of Marxian theory of the spontaneous process of society. It was obvious that both Marx and Engels demonstrated the abnormal “process of natural history” in the negative and critical context, in the hope that the particular historical “inversion” of the subject and object could be subject to sublation in the realm of freedom of human liberation, when confronted with spontaneous economy (especially the situation in capitalist society in which economic power dominates humans as subjects) in the development of social history anaogous to blind movements in nature. However, such a special statement of theirs was misinterpreted as the general law of the development of social history in classical textbooks on historical materialism. The so-called spontaneous historical process of society was mistaken for the common state of the whole development of social history. The development of human social history was thereby interpreted as a process of natural history independent of the human will and submissive to “the order of nature” in society. Simultaneously, I further discovered two opposite opinions on the development of social history in the development of modern western Marxist philosophy: the humanistic school from the young Lukacs to Sartre vs. the scientistic school from Althusser to analytic Marxism. The former is called “critical Marxist” from the perspective of the subject while the latter is provided with a positivist orientation proceeding from objective laws. According to the two extreme opinions, Marxist historical dialectics is “divided into two sides”: it either emphasizes nothing but subjectivity and critical nature or simply highlights decisive objective factors in social existence, resulting in a metaphysical logical confrontation.
Facing such an academic dilemma, I set such a temporary academic goal as exploring the overall Circumstance of Marxist historical dialectics: it uplifts the revoluntionary critical spirit of historical dialectics again on the basis of the principles of historical materialism as well as sticks to the principles. As I claimed at that time, “it not only illustrates the initiative and dominant position of humans as subjects in a scientific way but also adheres to the common basis of material production and objective necessity of the development of social history. Marxist scientific concept of history is supposed to be the all-sided unity of historical dialectics that historically affims the human role as the subject and historical materialism that insists on proceeding from the considerations of practical material production.” Meanwhile, I defined my academic attempt as “the subjective dimension of Marxist historical dialectics” in a narrow sense as distinguished from the humanistic concept of subject in Western Marxism. Therein I originated the basic idea of employing the theory of similarity to nature and the theory of enslavement by things as the facade of construction, and discussed the historical and practical significance of my theory respectively from diverse angles such as the historical study and monographic study of developmental study. From the current point of view, the theory of similarity to nature and the theory of enslavement by things  are still a kind of crucial theoretical identification. Because only through the establishment of the categories of similarity to nature and enslavement by things was I able to correct the serious misinterpretation of such an major idea of Marx and Engels made by the traditional framework of philosophical interpretation and did I strive to reunify the historical dialectics which had lopsidedly been split into the two logical extremes of subjectivity and objectivity by Western Marxism as well. Such an academic attempt is supposed to be of considerable academic value and practical significance whether at that time or at present.
However, some limitations must be pointed out. In the first place, the research methods I adopted in the present book are tentative. The description of the development of Marxian philosophical thought in Chapter One and Two contains my historical analysis and textual interpretation to some degree, which are, however, neither comprehensive nor standardized. Secondly, I did not get access to the crucial recent data of MEGA2, especially volumes of economic notes associated with the comprehension of the real context of changes in Marxian philosophical thought. Thirdly, while analyzing the theory of similarity to nature and the theory of enslavement by things, I was indulging in the method of “making matches” between homogeneous subjects that I myself later definitely criticized. In view of the above, readers need to critically discriminate among the discussion in the book. If possible, it would be better to have my subsequent book Back Marx—the Philosophical Discouse in the Context of Economics for reference.
In preparing this second edition of the book I have kept the book entirely the same as before except polishing it in language, correcting a few obvious printing errors and revising notes and references. I am happy to express my thanks to Professor Wu Yufang and my students, Wu Jing and Meng Mugui, for their painstaking help in reading and checking the text of this book.
Finally, I would like to acknowledge my debt to Henan People’s Press, who published the first edition of this book in 1995. Meanwhile, my heartfelt thanks also goes to Nanjing University Press for the opportunity they offered to publish the second edition of this book.
It deserves to be believed that one is lucky to witness a transition between two centuries and one is happy to encounter a change of the millennium. And we surprisingly have the two opportunities at a time. Time flies! Isn’t it enough to cause our sorrow for the limitedness of our existence? In the first spring of the millennium, let’s make joint efforts to testify our genuine existence as Oriental thinkers.

                                          Zhang Yibing
                           In Hejialong, Wuchang, on Feb. 10, 2001
      

Preface
Since its birth about 150 years ago, there have been endless debates about Marxist philosophy. There has been no agreement in comprehension among supporters, much less between supporters and opponents. Nevertheless, varieties of dissensions differs from each other in the way and nature. Some of them are within the bounds of reason in that the disputes between each other do not conceal their agreement on basic orientation. Such dissentions are in the majority and common. On the contrary, the other type of dissensions exceed the above bounds of reason, one side or both of which, wittingly or unwittingly, gradually widens the gap between stands in the disputes so as to engender an open opposition between their basic orientation. The latter are in a minority and uncommon. We should have the following attitude towards the former category of dissentions: we should be tolerant of them and accept them with an open mind in order to learn from each other to complement each other, whereas concerning the latter, we must distinguish between right and wrong, making compromises on basic orientation by no means.
The developments and changes in Marxist philosophy are not only closely related to political practice but also strongly influenced by the changes of trend of thought. It has undergone both the high tide and the low tide of revoluntion, both the turbulent time of change and the tranquil time of development. It has experienced both the phase of aggression and the phase of retreat in politics, seeing both the change of strategic goals and the shift of the focus of efforts. The  approach of any strategic change endowed with characterics of the times is inevitably accompanied by the division and reorganization of people’s political orientations and practice as well as the change of political concepts. In order to promote and solve the change, people are bound to advance having a new comprehension and interpretation of Marxism, especially its theoretical basis—the demand of Maxist philosophy. It was during the time of the strategic change that the upsurge in the discussion on Marxist philosophy among the Chinese academia arising in the early 1980s was going on. As far as the background is concerned, it was also exposed to the influence of the flooding of various contemporary western social thought.
It must be seen that history is always developing in the direction of advancement however tortuous it is. The purpose of retreating from old positions is to develop and consolidate new positions. The adjustment of strategic task means neither abandoning the ultimate goal nor  ideologically refuting the ideas that were previously looked upon as the principles for political practice without analysis as falsehood or purging them totally. All should be examined from the changing macroscopical historical perpective. We need to face more actual conditions and the main strategic goal and strategic task in every different historical stage, accordingly investigating whether the principles and ideas dominating the philosophical spirit of the stage are of historical inevitability and rationality. According to this idea, Marxist philosophy tends to take on diverse style and features and perform different social functions with both the change of the times and the turn of history. It guides and regulates human historical practice and in turn enriches, reforms and develops itself through human historical practice. However, this development does not aim at totally sublating the past history, much less radically changing its principles. Hence, when a succession of new historical challenges must be met on a large scale in the face of the change of the times, it is wrong to follow the beaten track and refuse to make either further exploration or timely changes; however, it is even worse to attempt to totally deny or play tricks with the basic ideas and dominant principles with an excuse about the exploration and changes. It is a pity that both tendencies are shown to different degrees according to the present situation of the Chinese academia.
Any development is the extension of history—not the simple extension, though. Not only is the couse of development full of twists and turns, but also there are seeming returns to the starting point though the returns aim at seeking a new starting point to advance towards a higher goal instead of abandoning all that is attained fruitfully. When mentioning that the proletarian socialist revolutions cannot but make its way through hardships and frustration, Marx said, “proletarian revolutions, like those of the nineteenth century, constantly criticize themselves, constantly interrupt themselves in their own course, return to the apparently accomplished, in order to begin anew; they deride with cruel thoroughness the half-measures, weaknesses, and paltriness of their first attempts, seem to throw down their opponents only so the latter may draw new strength from the earth and rise before them again more gigantic than ever, recoil constantly from the indefinite colossalness of their own goals—until a situation is created which makes all turning back impossible, …”  Marxist philosophy has gone through a similar course of development to that mentioned above. “Back to Marx”, as well as “returning to the original texts of Marx”, is the common orientation of those who are committed to the study of Marxist philosophy. As Marx vividly described above, it is certainly correct and sensible to redo the work without hesitation so as to advance Marxist thought and cause stoutly and thoroughly.
We return to both a real Marx and his original works for the purpose of further exploring the real essence of the change of Marxist philosophical revolution by using the rich experience of the history of revolution and theory (both successful and unsuccessful, both positive and negative) for over a century together with abundant and vivid facts in the historical development of the world after Marx for reference. Through the exploration we further delve deep into the new theoretical level and spiritual connotation so that Marxist theories can not only be applied to destroying an old order of the world successfully, but also to establish a new order of the world successfully; additionally, they can be successfully employed not only during the old era of revolution and war but also during the new era of peace and development, which is the call of the times as well as a new historical mission of Marxist philosophy. A big issue that the present Chinese Marxist philosophers concentrate on is whether Marxist philosophy is able to face the challenge of the times and shoulder heavy historical responsibilities.
The present book of Comrade Zhang Yibing was written with his above ideological background after over ten years’ study. In this book the author aims at restoring the principle of subjectivity of Marxist philosophy with no igorance of its principle of objectivity; he intends carrying forward the humanistic spirit of Marxist philosophy without any derogation from its scientific spirit. Objecting to mechanistic philosophy, the book firmly defends the materialist stand. Emphasizing the basic role of practice in Marxist philosophy, it does not deny the priority of nature over human social practice and argues the priority will be maintained for ever. The author  refers to a variety of achievements in “Western Marxist” study, but he still keeps a clear head to notice and resist their many wrong basic orientations. Despite special emphasis laid on reforming and improving the expositive system of Marxist philosophy, this book aims at making an thorough and detailed philosophical exploration into the socialist road with Chinese characteristics that Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping inaugurated. I believe, the publication of this book will vigorously promote the further study and discussion on Marxist philosophy in China.

Sun Bogui
                                 At Nanjing University, on Aug. 24, 1994

Preface by the Author

After reading the abstract of this book, quite many readers may feel deeply shocked: Isn’t it what Marx argued that “the development of human social history is a process of natural history?” Aren’t you criticizing Marx? Here I can tell readers with clearness and exactness that I am not criticizing Marx but correcting some misinterpretation of Marxist conception of history within the classical framework of philosophical interpretation.
Clearly, it is a deep theoretical issue which is not easy to distinguish. I would like to start with my confusion over the issue and the resolution of the confusion.
More than ten years ago when I was still a graduate majoring in philosophical principles at Department of Philosophy of Nanjing University, my instructor, Prof. Li Huayu, chaired our seminars on historical materialism. Then each of us was required to collect data on our own and make a presentation on a certain subject of historical materialism. The topic I selected is “As to the Logical Base of Historical Materialism.” In this assignment I viewed the subject from the perspective of historical investigation instead of stopping on the plane of the debate on the subject in the academia of the time (in 1980). Although in the discussion I, on the basis of the analysis on the logical base of historical philosophy prior to Marxism, properly argued that the logical base of the conception of history of Marxist philosophy is the production and reproduction of material life, I still faintly felt that there was some indescribable regrettable imperfection in my argument. I first started with the historical pivot beyond man that ancient “natural determinism” contended followed by a transition from “creationism” to humanistic conception of history that stresses human subjective initiative. In my opinion of the day, what is the closes to Marxist conception of history is the objective logical foothold established by excluding human nature once again from the cause of the historical development in Hegelian philosophy. The scientific conception of history in Marxist philosophy was established by means of Marx and Engels’s historical establishment of practice—the active material creation of human subjecst, resulting in the true revelation of the objective laws of the developmemt of human social history. Marx’s first great discovery is precisely the dynamic role that scientifically identifies humans as subjects in historical realisitic concrete social material life.  Up to this point I strongly became aware of two essential logical layers in Marxist scientific conception of history: it not only scientifically illustrate the dynamic and dominant role of humans as subjects, but also adheres to both the basis of general material production and the objective necessity of the development of social history. It is a unity of historical dialectics that affirms historically man’s subjective role and historical materialism that insists on proceeding from realistic material production. However, the above ideas are hard to find out within the classical framework of philosophical interpretation adopted as my theoretical context of the time.
Within the classical framework of philosophical interpretation, Marxian historical materialism has always been interpreted as something almost unrelated to the real subject of history—man. Within the framework the colorful social being of humans is reduced to the simple addition of three substances: geographical environment, the population decreasing to a natural quantity, and the modes of material production seemingly unrelated to man. The basic contradiction and “dialectic movement” between the productive forces and the relations of production as well as between the economic base and the superstructure in the social movement appear to be objective processes separate from man (, which is virtually only the interpretation of dogmatism on the objective dimension of Marxist historical dialectics). Most importantly, the Marxian theory that the economic force represents the leading force dominating humans as subjects at a certain historical stage is interpreted as the general condition of social history; accordingly, the development of human social history is considered as a “process of natural history” both independent of the human will and submissive to the “natural laws” in society. As far as these points are concerned, the classical framework seems to stick to materialist principles in the development of social history indeed, give prominence to scientific epistemology and methodology characterizing historical materialism indeed, and abolish the root of idealist conception of history. Nevertheless, the general dialectics of the development of social history is totally “vaporized” within the framework; so is Marx’s statement that “history does nothing” but the practice of humans as subjects, historically, concretely and realistically, creates the fundamental course of human social history from the lower level to the higher and from realm of necessity to realm of freedom. Human subjective initiative in social history simply remains to be the reaction of social consciousness, gradually withering in the aspect of subjective initiative. In the final analysis, Marxist conception of history retrogresses to the Hegelian argumentation that “history is an objective course beyond man.”
At that moment I felt a dull pain by a deep consciousness of imperfectness, but I could never scientifically illuminate the sticking point deep in the classical framework of philosophical interpretation.
Subsequently my new thought arose in the seminars on the history of Marxist philosophy chaired by Prof. Sun Bogui. My study of classical texts on Marxist philosophy offered me the first-hand data I needed and spurred me on to start a long and tough time of study (1983-1988) as well. Although the study was really beset with difficulties and was even suspended for a time after my graduation, I staggered and at last found a way out. Finally came the realization that the significance of the ideological revolution that Marxist philosophy accomplished is, above all, that it establishes a practical, active and revolutionary scientific conception of the world, namely practical materialism, whose theoretical essence is not the intuitive reflection of external objects as interpreted within the classical framework of philosophical interpretation, but the scientific cognition based on the historical change of external objects and humans by humans as subjects through objective material practice. As Marx’s first great discovery, materialist conception of history in particular is by no means just the so-called onlooking intuitive reflection of the objective social laws beyond humans as subjects, but the scientific comprehension that is constructed by historical, concrete and realistic human social practice and with which man scientifically understands nature, human beings and the historical course of society. Marxist conception of history, in the first place, discloses the general basis of objective material production in the development of human social history and scientifically clarifies the objective laws of historical dialectics, which is the objective angle of historical materialism (as well as the Marxist conception of history in a broad sense). Based on this premise, Marx also started from the subject of human society to seek the dominant factors in different historical phases of society. While investigaing the history of human civilization, he pointed out that the economic force in social-economic formation is a decisive and dominant factors independent of the human will (,which is the Marxist conception of history in a narrow sense). However, it is not a constant state of the development of human social history. As the productive forces of human society develop, humans as subjects itself will transcend the determined historical status and become the master who creates history on his own initiative.
Therefore, historical materialism can not be simply understood as the negative spontaneous determinism, for it is the spiritual power to inspire people to struggle rather than the “empirical science” that bings inertia to people and deprives the practical and dynamic role of humans as subjects with commandment of “having a high regard for objective laws”. It calls for the change of the world and the establishment of human initiative on the basis of practical historical dialectics, which both aim at exerting human objective subjectivity better. With this general theoretical orientation, I tried to have a fresh understanding of Marx and his practical materialism based on my independent study. Thus I discovered Marx’s theory on similarity to nature in the logical perspective of subjective dimension in the dialectics of the development of social history that had been misinterpreted and neglected by the classical framework of philosophical interpretation for a long time, and found the key joint of the theory and modern social development. In the following study I made a further discovery of the intrinsic basis of Marxian theory of similarity to nature, that is, the significant doctrine of enslavement by things in his theory of social criticism. I was greatly gratified at these discoveries. The following are the main arguments of my study, also an abstract of this book.
I first started with the interpretation of Marx’s statement that “the development of human social history is a process of natural history” within the classical framework of philosophical interpretation. It seems to me that in the present study of historical materialism when defining the objectivity of the development of social history, researchers mostly tend to quote Marx’s statement that “the development of social-economic formation is a process of natural history” from the preface in Volume One of his Capital. In my opinion, the purpose to quote such a statement within the classical framework of philosophical interpretation is actually biased and additionally the statement is garbled to represent the general features of the whole development of human social history, resulting in far more difference between the quotation and what Marx originally meant, which is exactly the initial deviation of the major misinterpretation.
Hence I have to proceed with Marxian historical delimitation of so-called “social-economic formation.” Certainly, in the preface in the first volume of Capital Marx clarified that his book is aimed at disclosing the economic laws of capitalism (“modern society”). When defining the economic necessity of capitalist modes of production, he claimed that humans as subjects is nothing but “the personification of economic category” under such a specified historical condition. Meanwhile, he further pointed out, “I hold the opinion that the development of social-economic formation is similar to both the spontaneous course and spontaneous history.”  Herein Marx originally meant to explicate certain particularity in capitalist modes of production that the social life of humans as subjects reversedly assumes the non-subjective spontaneous course enslaved by the materialized economic force humans themselves create (, which I define as enslavement by things in the development of social history in this book to distinguish it from the young Marx’s humanistic doctrine of “alienation” ). Since humans as subjects is extrinsically presented by the personification of the object of economic process, the social-historical development of humans as subjects becomes a process analogous to the history of nature independent of the human will like the spontaneous course without the subject (, which is described as “similarity to nature” in my book). Such is Marx’s elaboration on specific economic laws in the development of capitalist society, from which he, however, did not derive the argument that “the development of human social history is a process of natural history for ever.” The latter is the misinterpretation of theoreticians from the Second International, which has been distorted into the existing false stereotype within the classical framework of philosophical interpretation via the “legal” verdict given by the academia of the Soviet Union.
   Apparently, according to the historical materialist interpretation of the classical framework, social-economic formation is defined as the economic base together with the superstructure (the productive forces are also involved in some definitions), becoming the general social formation or structure. Then the conclusion that “the development of human social history is a process of natural history for ever” is logically drawn from Marx’s statement mentioned above. From my point of view, this is a serious theoretical misinterpretation because it practically confuses the developmental laws during specific periods of the development of human social history that Marx disclosed (the historical materialism in a narrow sense) that the external control of economy over the human leads to a state in history identical with that dominant in unconscious nature simply with the general laws of social development, mistaking the historical phenomenon that the historical laws of human society are manifested by natural laws for a constant law of the development of human society in general.
As a matter of fact, the term “social-economic formation” (, which should be translated into “the economic formation of society”, to be exact, for its original German text is Okonomische Geslls-chaftsformation,) Marx employed has the specified connotation. It does not generally refer to the economic formations in the whole social history, but in particular to the specific historical stage since human history developed into civilization, especially in the developmental form of capitalist society. The essential point of this historical stage is the intrinsic “antagonism” of the development of social history dependent on private ownership (See the preface of Marx’s the Critique of Political Economy, but the overstriking here is given by the author of this book). As to the division of historical stages, we are familiar with Marxian doctrine of “Five Major Forms” that the development of human society is divided into primitive society, slave society, feudal society, capitalist society and communist (or socialist) society in the light of the difference in the relations of production in different developmental stages of society in order of the development of human society (especially the Western social history), which is also a vital foundation of classical diachronic study of both the division of historical stages and historical materialism. In fact, in his study of the division of stages of social history he made abundant exposition of the development of human social history concerning various theoretical issues during different periods, of which “Five Major Forms” is just the simplified epitome provided by later scholars. More importantly, to make an in-depth theoretical discussion, in his study of social history Marx divided the development of human society into three basic forms (types) in accordance with the practical and specific historical position of humans as subjects in the development of social history. For my part, it is a doctrine on Marxist conception of social history from the perspective of historical dialectics that is of great importance but has been ignored.
Marx developed his analysis from different theoretical perspectives as follows: firstly, from the perspective of the position of humans as subjects in the historical development, Marx came up with the social forms of “personal independence founded on personal dependence,” of “personal independence founded on objective dependence” and of “free individuality, based on the universal development of individuals and on their subordination of their communal, social productivity as their social wealth.”  Next, in term of human social relations, society can be classified into that of “a local connection resting on blood ties, or on primeval, natural or master-servant relations,” that with the manifestation of “objective connection” as well as that of “universally developed individuals, whose social relations, as their own communal relations.”  Thirdly, in view of objective laws of social development, there appears society of natural necessity, society of economic necessity and “society of free human development.” The first two are “realm of necessity” in the “prehistoric” development of human society, while the last is “realm of freedom.” The second great social form designated by Marx above is precisely the model of the economic formation of society.
I found that Marx took the view that the economic formation of society is not the general form of the development of human history but the product of a specific phase of the development of human social history. In ancient society dominated by natural necessity, it is personal production of humans rather than material production that predominates in the existence and development of human society (, which does not exclude social material produciton from the general decisive basis of society). When the productive forces reach a certain point, material production will be independent of human production and predominate over it. Material production appears as a special economic power, forcing man, as the subject of history, subjected to the rule of external economic necessity. Though man is no longer a slave to natural necessity, showing his independence of nature in the economic force, he becomes a slave to the new objective force he created by himself (“the invisible hand” arising from the pell-mell development of commodity economy). Human society, in a sense, exceeds nature (or animality), creating history on its own, but the activity is still restricted and therefore blindly free because, with humans remaining “economic animals” and history occurring beyond humans as before, the development of human social history still seems analogous to the development of nature (contemporaneous with “manuscripts written in Paris” of 1844). In earlier stages, Marx defined that phenomenon as the “alienation” of history, and he still acknowledged the historic “alienation” (, which should, to be exact, be “enslavement by things”) according to the scientific conception of history after the establishment of historical materialism. Nevetheless, he here specified further that the rule of economic necessity over man is not permanent but temporary. With the development of the productive forces, when personal production regains the predominance, that of the economic force over individuals will not exist any more. That is to say, by the end of the prehistoric phase of human society the economic formation of society is bound to be transcended; in other words, the similarity of the development of human society to that of nature as well as enslavement by things is bound to be transcended!
Careful readers may find some similar ideas held by certain western “humanistic” Marxists: Lukacs’s objection to “economic priority” and the subsequent concept of “economic individuals” as well as the proposition that “it is the spontaneous domination of economic laws over social history that is supposed to be transcended.” (Lefebvre, Fromm) They alleged that the human liberation predicted by Marx precisely refers to the sublation of lopsided “economic individuals (animals)” in conjunction with the realization of universally developed individuals, and that the society in which economy predominates will certainly be replaced by a real historical stage of human society, and otherwise. In view of that, we need to make careful differentiation. On the one hand, it should be acknowledged that western Marxists paid attention to Marx’s important statement on historical dialectics, a perspective undergoing a period of long neglect in historical materialism; on the other hand, it must be noticed that on account of their failure to scientifically understand the progressive relation between the narrow sense and the broad sense of Marxist scientific conception of history and correctly distinguish the dialectic relation between the foundation and dominant factors of social history, they cannot but go ahead from negating economic necessity to negating material production, the general social base, eventually deviating from historical materialism in essence and retrogressing to subjective dialectics of humanism.
Now let’s have a look at the true significance of Marx’s argument that “the economic formation of society should be viewed as a process of natural history.” Marx specified the similarity to nature in the development of the economic formation of society (he had never referred to the whole development of social history), from which the proposition can be deduced on no account that “the whole development of social history becomes the process of natural history independent of man.” This statement of Marx’s simply confirms that after the emergence of private ownership, especially the society of class antagonism is the economic formation of society (in high antiquity man depended immediately on nature so that the development of social history at that time was virtually inferior to nature), on which he once stated clearly, “ancient, feudal and modern capitalist mode of production can be considered as the phases of development of the economic formation of society.” In such a social form there exists such various blind external necessity as that in the development of nature; that is, the developmental laws of social history are externalized by “natural laws.” As we know, Marx was always prudent in the issue of “natural laws”. For one thing, he objected to bourgeois classical economists’ eternalizing the historical laws of the development of capitalist society and defining them as “natural laws”; for another thing, he employed “natural laws” in a sense opposite to the real human social history. What he stated above evidently bears the second meaning.
Marx argued that the pell-mell development of the economic formation of society (capitalist society in particular) similar to natural development is nothing but a transitional historical state, a certain stage of social development, which accounts for limitation and spontaneity of the development of capitalist society. As the productive forces have improved, the “natural laws” implemented by means of blind destruction are bound to be substituted by the real “laws of social production”; so is the human enslavement by things created by man bound to be radically transcended! By then, the developpment of human social history will no more appear as a process of natural history but a process of human social history in the real sense; moreover, the human role as the subject of history will not fulfilled in the form of pell-mell multidimensional join forces any more but of a unified conscious creative power. Sublating the external economic necessity, human society will enter realm of freedom from realm of necesstiy.
It should equally be specified that though Marx’s view on the leap from realm of necessity to realm of freedom have been frequently cited in previous studies, the deep structure and true significance of such a key point of Marx and Engels’s have not been really grasped theoretically. The external necessity of social history, namely the economic laws functioning blindly “independent of the human will, has been mostly taken as eternal historical laws so that man seems to be permanently restricted by the objective world, which, however, is quite inaccurate. Generally speaking, historical laws are different from natural laws. The latter cannot be created; the former are spontaneous in prehistoric society (, which is what Marx called the first and second social forms) and unlikely to be created consciously likewise. In this sense, man is locked in the social realm of necessity. However, in the future communist society Marx imagined, a real human society with both highly developed material production and universal and free development of individuals, sublating and presupposing necessity, history will be on the threshold of realm of freedom. At that point man will be the master of his own history, not only correctly understanding and choosing historical laws but also creating his own history wholly consciously in accordance with his own scientific will and practical intention (instead of enslaving nature against ecology!). That is exactly where communism in essence surpasses any previous society. Hence, a succession of Marx’s discussion on “real human society” (the overall historical process), “the capital human” (the subject of history), “realm of freedom” (the status and position of human beings in history), and “the union of free individuals”(social structure) all needs careful examination with a new discourse framework of Marx’s own. Deepening that subject will certainly have considerable theoretical influence over grasping the essence of the development of social history on the basis of historical materialism, learning basic differences between communism and all previous class societies, investigating the latest changes of the present capitalism as well as studying strategically the direction and historical course of current modern socialist construction and all-round reform with Chinese characteristics.
In conclusion, Marx indeed stated in the preface of Capital that the development of “the economic formation of human society” is similar to that of natural history. But his “economic formation of society” herein does not generally designate all human social forms, but only in particular the historical stage in the development of human social history where the economic force determines humans as subjects. Marx originally meant to clarified that in the specific historical phases the objective economic force created by humans as subjects is reversedly expressed in the dominator of social history (“enslavement by things”), while humans as subjects, unable to be the master of its own activities, develops abnormally into the personification of economic relations; history appears to occur and operate excluded from human beings in a state similar to the pell-mell movement of nature (“similarity to nature”). Consequently, social history with humans as the subjects is abnormally objectified by the natural historical process; human subjective activities constituted by human beings themselves turn into objective activities independent of the human will; human history manifests the antihuman nature. The most representative form is capitalist mode of production (Surely, what Marx here expounded is still laissez-faire capitalism and the social forms prior to capitalism).
Such is the original implication of Marx’s idea that the development of social-economic formation in human social history is similar to the process of natural history. However, within the classical framework of philosophical interpretation such a proposition has been interpreted as something totally contrary to Marxist thought. Seemingly, Marx contended that the economic formation of society is just the general social form so that the whole development of human social history will appear as the process of natural history. In that case, it is better to claim that the dominance of the economic force over man and social history arising from capitalist mode of production is a permanent and unchangeable objective natural phenomenon. Or rather, the classical framework of philosophical interpretation seems to argue that capitalism is unsurpassable!?
To be sure, we should acknowledge that the starting point of the argument within the classical framework of philosophical interpretation is not completely wrong. It is known to us all that the development of human social history differs from the unrestrained movement of nature mainly in that the former consists of intentional activities of humans as subjects. That is why in the light of idealism among all previous conceptions of history human subjective motives are viewed as the essence of social history. Denifitely opposed to various idealist determinism, Marxist materialist conception of history demonstrates scientifically that in the development of human social history exist inherent objective laws, which is the materialist principle of Marxist conception of history (including the objective dimension of historical dialectics). It is on the basis of Marx’s proposition above that the classical framework of philosophical interpretation illustrates the objective necessity in the development of social history. Such a basic orientation is not wrong. However, Marx only specified certain phases in the development of human social history that are analogous to the process of natural history rather than designated the whole historical course in general; what’s more important, herein he certainly demonstrated objective necessity, but he did not prove the general necessity of the development of human social history; instead, he specially criticized non-subjective economic necessity represented by capitalism in which objects dominate humans, an abnormal state only in the economic formation of society where economy determines everything. Furthermore, both human enslavement by things man himself creates and natural alienation of human activities are destined to be transcended by further development of social history, which is precisely Maxist proletarian value orientation as well as the base of communism.
Personally, the classical framework of philosophical interpretation has only put a theoretically superficial interpretation on Marxism. Anyhow, it is generally acceptable to illustrate objective laws of the development of human social history simply in view of this statement of Marx’s in the preface of Capital. However, Marx took capitalist mode of production as a metaphor for something similar to the movement of nature, which, in essence, has greater theoretical significance, which just accords with the historic significance of his establishment of capitalist system. Alternatively, it is in order to clarify capitalist mode of production has not essentially overstepped nature (animals) and nor is it the real beginning of the development of human society that Marx defined similarity to nature and enslavement by things of the economic formation of society. Nevertheless, the classical framework of philosophical interpretation has failed to figure out the deep meaning of Marx’s analysis, simply generalizing his argument according to its surface meaning and misinterpreting the particular distortion of the development of human history only prior to capitalist mode of production that Marx defined as the general rule of social development.
Next, paying close attention to only one aspect of Marxist conception of social history, namely the fundamental principles of historical materialism, the classical framework of philosophical interpretation has to a large extent ignored the subjective dimension of historical dialectics, a deep theoretical logic that Marx equally attached great importance to and applied to the exploration into dominant factors of social historical course. Historical dialectics is not the contradictory development of objective dialectics in the abstract historical course, but the logic of practical dialectics based on the realistic and concrete historical status of humans as subjects. In my judgement, failure to have a scientific understanding of the dialectical relation between two different logical perspectives in Marxist scientific conception of history is critical to the misunderstanding of the essence of Marxist conception of history. The theorists of the Second International initiated the misinterpretation of Marxist philosophy as a kind of “onlooking empirical science” beyond the development of human social history. With the practical initiative of humans as subjects, the core of Marxist philosophy, greatly weakened, Marxist conception of social history seems to focus on no more than the material conditions of the development of social history, whereas the real subject of historical development — real people under given historical conditions — simply shrinks back to have one-sided “subjective initiative” (the opposite of western Marxist humanism). That is a total deviation from Marxist scientific conception of the world — practical materialism. Such a theoretical misinterpretation has been refuted by both the Russian Revolution (1917) led by Lenin and the socialist revolutionary road with Chinese characteristics inaugurated by Mao Zedong in practical socialist movement.
Marxist scientific conception of history, above all, certainly acknowledges that the development of social history follow objective laws and that production and reproduction in human life represent the general foundation of the development of social history; however, all of these are practically and actively constructed by humans as subjects and in no case the natural growth of things beyond people. Marxist philosophy is in essence revoluntionary and practical, whose theoretical logic is definitely communism, which is oriented towards the establishment of human roles as subjects along with the ultimate liberation of human beings, and specific ways to achieve communism as well. Marxist philosophy aims not only to interprete the world, but, more importantly, change it, which is the only slogan written in the banner of Marxist practical materialism! Practical and dynamic dialectics of social history is the essence of Marxian doctrines of similarity to nature and enslavement by things.
Such is the theoretical gist of the present book.
Now, in addition, there is a need for me to give an account of both principles and conceptions of writing this book. In the book, refutation is the first theoretical principle I have established. Since this book tries to correct the misinterpretation of Marxian relation between the development of human social history and the historical course of nature within the classical framework of philosophical interpretation, I am always telling some of Marx’s propositions from something else among quantities of expositions, which is a theoretical thread. The second one is radical reform in theoretical logic, that is, proceeding from authenticity of Marx’s theoretical texts and expounding their essence of historical theory in a scientific way. Some researchers are inclined to impose some arguments of their own upon the object of study. While writing, I was always as careful as possible to define the logical orientation in the original context and the initial sense of Marxism (although it is impossible according to modern interpretative theories). I did label explicitly all my viewpoints (for example, the terms like “similarity to nature” and “enslavement by things”). The third is adhering to unity of theoretical history and logic, especially giving prominence to the historical perspective in studying Marxist philosophy. From my point of view, not least among the main faults in the classical framework of philosophical interpretation is exactly its failure to study Marxism in accordance with Marxist viewpoints, namely, in a word, the failure to historically study the texts of classical Marxist writers. The overall theoretical framework of this book is proceeding from the considerations of historical thread of the development of Marxist philosophy and establishing the logic of Marxist theories in the context of the history of Marxist philosophy. Fourthly, I persist in the scientific approach of taking the internal logic development of theories as a starting point in consideration in writing this book to free myself from stringing volumes of external data together longstanding in the study of Marxism. As readers can see, the motive force of theoretical construction of this book lies in the quest for two different logical perspectives in Marxist scientific conception of history (materialist conception of history in a broad sense defining material production as the basis of social history vs. materialist conception of history in a narrow sense seeking dominant factors of the development of social history, logic of objective description in the objective dimension of historical materialism and historical dialectics vs. logic of initiative in the subjective dimension of historical dialectics) as well as the internal connection between them. Apparently, the arguemnt of this book is based on the latter essential logic that has been ignored for long (, which, admittedly, is present in a way of metaphor to a considerable degree in Marxian texts). Fifthly, this book does not make a comprehensive discussion on Marxist scientific conception of history, but centres on the subjective dimension of practical Marxist historical dialectics to which little attention has been paid in our theoretical study over a long period of time, that is, showing concern and the ultimate solicitude for living conditions of humans as subjects pertinent to Marx’s criticism of capitalism and scientific socialism. Accordingly this book is the one on a special subject. The sixth is the integration of theory and practice, which is, likewise, the practical purpose of writing this book, for the study of Marxist scientific theories tends to call forth its internal vitality only when combined with social historical practice. Marxist philosophy is in itself a movement of scientific thought that never ceases developing itself in historical practice.
I am expecting that the book can activate some hard thinking of everyone who intends to be freed from the classical framework of philosophical interpretation and adopt a serious attitude towards Marxist theories on social history.
Last but not least, I want to clarify that my instructor, Prof. Sun Bogui, has had considerable influence on the fundamental academic orientation of this book, especially the developmental logic of Marxist philosophy as the basic framework of the book. In the book the discussion on both the two transitions in the revolution of Marxist philosophy and double logical contradictions derives inspiration directly from similar views in Prof. Sun’s An Exploration of the Explorers’ Road. The two books can be considered to be in direct line of academic descent. For my part, Prof. Sun is an inaugurator in constructing a discourse of deep historical logic in Chinese study of the history of Marxist philosophy. We did not have access to Althusser’s“epistemological rupture” in the discourse of Pan-structuralism until early in the 1980s. Despite the similarity between Althusser’s doctrine of historical stages of Marxist philosophy and our positions in the span of each stage, the two theoretical discourses are still definitely heterogeneous. In this book I collate and stipulate such a crucial theoretical distinction. Of course, all the arguments of the book reflect my personal points of view. I am entirely responsible for any errors and blemishes.
 
 

                                                   Zhang Yibing
                                        In Nanjing, in January, 1993